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THE RISE OF PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE IN CHINA: 
EMPIRICAL MODELS, THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK, AND 
INSTITUTIONAL ANALYSIS 
Wang Xixin* and Zhang Yongle** 
An important norm in traditional Confucian political thought 
requires the government to take into account the opinions of the 
people subject to its jurisdiction.  That norm, however, was usually 
respected only in theory but not implemented in practice.  To date, 
China’s model of governance has continued to be closed to outsiders, 
including the governed.  The Republican and Communists’ 
Revolutions during the twentieth century did not fulfill their promises 
to change this basic structure.  China’s government remains a very 
hierarchical and closed party-state structure.  Such a political 
structure has been variously described as “totalitarian” and 
“authoritarian.”1  It can be quite efficient in policy implementation, 
but it has been much weaker in terms of sensitivity and 
responsiveness to public opinions and perceptions.2 
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 1 See, e.g., Sujian Guo, Totalitarianism: An Outdated Paradigm for Post-Mao China?, 
14 J. NORTHEAST ASIAN STUD 62–90 (2015) (describing the political structure as totalitarian); 
SUJIAN GUO, POST-MAO CHINA: FROM TOTALITARIANISM TO AUTHORITARIANISM? (2000) 
(describing the change in political structure from totalitarian to authoritarian); JIE CHEN & 
PENG DENG, CHINA SINCE THE CULTURAL REVOLUTION: FROM TOTALITARIANISM TO 
AUTHORITARIANISM (1995) (describing the change in political structure from totalitarian to 
authoritarian).  See generally Andrew J. Nathan, Authoritarian Resilience, J. OF DEMOCRACY 
6–17 (2013) (describing the political structure as authoritarian). 
 2 See IMD Announces the 2011 World Competitiveness Rankings and the Results of 
the “Government Efficiency Gap”, INT’L INST. FOR MGMT. DEV. (May 17, 2011), 
http://www.imd.org/news/IMD-announces-the-2011-World-Competitiveness-Rankings-
and-the-results-of-the-Government-Efficiency-Gap.cfm [https://perma.cc/9LTN-FMQ3] 
(noting that China ranks 19th in IMD’s 2011 World Competitiveness Rankings, which places 
the US and Hong Kong as the most competitive countries).  For instance, during the Great 
Leap Forward Movement between the late 1950s and early 1960s, under the erroneous 
perception of having an agricultural breakthrough and that greater grain procurement was 
compatible with the peasants’ welfare, the Chinese party-state had effectively conducted 
massive grain extraction, only to result in the tragic 1959–1961 famine.  This is a perfect 
example of high effectiveness but low responsiveness in the Chinese governing model.  See 
Bertein, Stalinism, Famine, and Chinese Peasants: Grain Procurements during the Great 
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We argue in this Article that China’s traditional governing 
model is changing.  The development of a market economy and the 
diversification of interests in Chinese society have undermined the 
foundation of the old governing model and its rejection of much input 
from outside the party-state.  Both the general public and the 
leadership have recognized the old model’s practical shortcomings 
under current conditions.  Local officials have launched experiments 
of administrative reform, one feature of which is to respect and 
protect people’s rights to participate in government administration.  
As a result of these experiments, local governments have become 
more responsive to the public in dealing with public affairs.  These 
developments imply that a new model of governance may be 
emerging in China. 
We identify two models of administrative governance in 
China: the traditional “managerial model” and the emerging 
“participatory model.”  We focus our discussion on administrative 
decision-making processes because of the central role they play in 
administrative governance. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  In Part I, we define the 
main features and flaws of the managerial model.  In Part II, we 
analyze the failures of the traditional model and the emergence of a 
new, participatory model through the use of case studies.  In Part III, 
we consider in more detail the characteristics of the emerging new 
model, including its political legitimacy, essential values and 
institutional components. 
I.  THE MANAGERIAL MODEL AND ITS FAILINGS 
The longstanding model of decision-making in China was 
based on a planned economy and centralized political system (with 
deep roots in the politics and bureaucratic structures of imperial 
times).  Although in the reform era China has largely shifted to a 
market economy, this decision-making model remains relevant and 
                                                                                                           
Leap Forward, THEORY & SOCIETY 362–65 (1984) (describing the famine).  For policy 
implementation in the reform era, see DAVID M. LAMPTON, POLICY IMPLEMENTATION IN 
POST-MAO CHINA (1987) (detailing the policy implementation in post-Mao China).  For the 
general descriptions to the problems of the lack of sensitivity and responsiveness of Chinese 
administration, the research could be found widely from the research of Chinese 
authoritarianism, Andrew J. Nathan, supra note 1.  
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even dominant.  We call it the “managerial model,” whose basic 
features can be summarized as follows:3 
1. In terms of ideology, the party-state bureaucracy is 
regarded as the representative of the public interest and the arbiter of 
the common good; individuals and social groups are considered to 
represent partial and parochial interests.  The party-state governs and 
the people are the governed. 
2. In terms of organizational structure, the arrangement 
is pyramidal, bureaucratic and hierarchical.  Decision-making 
agendas and goals are passed down from higher to lower levels.  
Lower levels have little authority and incentive to respond to public 
opinion and demand.  Cadres at the lower levels of the party-state are 
often ordered to achieve rigidly defined targets, and are evaluated 
based on their fulfillment of those targets. 
3. In terms of agenda-setting in day-to-day governance, 
the party-state bureaucracy and its affiliated think tanks are dominant.  
The public has little opportunity to influence the agenda-setting 
except for filing petitions—or seeking for media attention—which 
the authorities can often ignore. 
4. In collecting and controlling the information flow that 
is vital to governance, the party-state decision-making bodies usually 
steer the process, initiating investigation and consultation as they see 
fit.  The public therefore may be consulted, but there is no process to 
guarantee that decision-making agencies will respond to public input 
or that issues of concern to significant parts of the public will reach 
the decision-makers.  More often than not, information that the 
government collects and that shapes its decisions is kept within the 
party-state’s decision-making bodies.  If such information is 
disclosed to the public, the purpose is often to mobilize the people to 
help implement policy and the disclosure is typically highly selective. 
5. To the extent that public input is encouraged or 
allowed, it generally must be expressed and represented through 
officially designated channels, for example, villagers through Village 
Committees, women through Women’s Associations, young people 
through Youth League organs, workers through official labor unions, 
                                                                                                           
 3 The following observation draws from our previous work.  See Wang Xixin & Zhang 
Yongle, Woguo Xingzheng Juece Moshi Zhi Zhuanxing¾Cong Guanli Zhuyi Moshi Dao 
Canyushi Zhili Moshi (我国行政决策模式之转型¾从管理主义模式到参与式治理模式) 
[The Transformation of Chinese Model of Decision-Making¾from Managerial Model to 
Model of Participatory Governance], 5 ZUEL L. J. (2012). 
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and so on.  Unauthorized associations and expressions of opinion on 
matters of policy and governance are discouraged (even when 
officially approved channels frequently function poorly). 
6. To foster public acceptance of official policy (which 
party-state authorities recognize is helpful in reducing the costs of 
implementing policies), decision-making bodies often try to shape the 
policy preference of the general public through political and social 
mobilization.4  If such efforts prove ineffective, it rarely prompts a 
change in policy, unless decision-makers conclude that the cost of 
implementing a policy that has failed to win public acceptance is 
simply too high.  Yet overall decision-making bodies rarely modify 
the original decision in response to the public’s policy preferences. 
7. The decision-making process offers only 
underdeveloped mechanisms for receiving feedback or correcting 
errors.  Public input that contradicts the preference of decision-
makers is generally not welcomed.  The public’s options are usually 
limited to trying to bypass the local-level or immediately relevant 
authorities to complain to higher authorities.  But lower-level 
authorities are often able to suppress this kind of “leapfrog petition.”  
When complaints do reach and persuade higher level leaders, even 
the top leadership has often to rely on ad hoc political mobilization 
within the bureaucracy to rectify errors and change policy 
implementation. 
We call this model “managerial” because governance is 
reduced essentially to decision-making agencies’ top-down 
management.  Decision-making agencies shape the public’s policy 
preferences, while the policy preferences of the public do not have 
any effective mechanism to influence the agencies’ decisions.  During 
China’s struggle for national independence (through the 1940s) and 
its period of rapid industrialization (which began during the 1950s), 
the managerial model was effective in “pooling resources of all sides 
for accomplishing large undertakings.”5  With its ability to achieve 
firm resolution of policy issues and strict discipline in implementing 
                                                                                                           
 4 During this political process, a mobilization model came into being, which political 
scientists call “participatory mobilization.”  In participatory mobilization, leaders try to 
inspire the enthusiasm of the masses, but do not expect pre-arranged guidelines, 
strategies/principles, and policies to be changed.  Zhu Rongji (朱镕基), Zhengfu Gongzuo 
Baogao (政府工作报告) [Report on the Work of the Government] (2002); XINHUANET, 
http://english.gov.cn/official/2005-07/29/content_18337.htm [https://perma.cc/A67L-
W2ZN] (last visited Sep. 27, 2017).  
 5 Id. 
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policies, this system built a solid foundation for China’s economic 
and social development.  Even under the planned economy, however, 
the managerial model’s serious defects were evident.  The party and 
government bureaucracy tended to become an autonomous group that 
was relatively unresponsive to society.  This tendency was also a 
breeding ground to corruption in the party-state.  Many commentators 
agree that during the Cultural Revolution (1966-76), Mao Zedong 
launched mass campaigns in an effort to reinvigorate the bureaucracy 
and to make it more responsive to the people.  But his radical 
prescription failed disastrously.  It led to full-scale chaos and 
paralysis of the party, the state and society.  In the end, it did not 
displace the traditional managerial model.6 
In December 1978, the Third Plenum of the 11th Central 
Committee of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) made economic 
development the top policy priority for the party-state.7  But reform 
of the decision-making system was not yet on the agenda.  The 
managerial model continued to function reasonably well in some 
respects from the early 1980s, when pro-development policies 
combined with policies of fiscal decentralization have given local 
governments strong incentives to develop the local economy and 
thereby to increase their revenues through capturing some of the gains 
from rapid growth.8  Still working within the managerial model, local 
governments shifted their entrepreneurial energy from the political 
realm to the economic realm, mobilizing financial, human, and 
institutional resources to promote local economic development.  This 
“local state corporatism” greatly enhanced China’s economic 
dynamism. 9   Competition among local governments for better 
                                                                                                           
 6 See HARRY HARDIN, ORGANIZING CHINA: THE PROBLEM OF BUREAUCRACY (1981) 
(explaining how the efforts to improve the bureaucracy were not beneficial); YICHING WU, 
CULTURAL REVOLUTION AT THE MARGINS: CHINESE SOCIALISM IN CRISIS (2014) (showing the 
problems with bureaucracy during the Cultural Revolution).  For a different view on Mao’s 
anti-bureaucratic agenda for the Cultural Revolution, see MARTIN K. WHYTE, WHO HATES 
BUREAUCRACY? A CHINESE PUZZLE (1984) (explaining a different opinion—that improving 
the bureaucracy was not what Mao Zedong intended). 
 7 Xi explains China’s reform plan, XINHUANET (Nov. 16, 2013),  
http://china.org.cn/china/third_plenary_session/2013-11/16/content_30619850.htm 
[https://perma.cc/5NR9-D39D]. 
 8 See Justin Yifu Lin & Zhiqiang Liu, Fiscal Decentralization and Economic Growth 
in China, 49 ECON. DEV. AND CULTURAL CHANGE 1 (2000) (explaining and describing how 
the economy was developed). 
 9 See Jean C. Oi, RURAL CHINA TAKES OFF: INSTITUTIONAL FOUNDATIONS OF 
ECONOMIC REFORM 139 (1999) (explaining how the Chinese economy grew). 
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economic performance in their localities helped achieve the 
astonishing “China speed” of development, but it also exposed 
weaknesses in the traditional model of governance.  First, as rapid 
development produced high social and environmental costs, local 
governments often responded by trying to avoid the “fiscal burdens” 
of dealing with the resulting problems, especially as growth in local 
government revenues slowed or declined. This in turn led to the 
shrinking of budgets for public services and social welfare, the 
widening of the disparities between the rich and the poor, and serious 
environmental degradation. Moreover, operating with great 
discretionary powers inside an essentially closed system, party cadres 
and state officials were particularly susceptible to corruption.10 
Predictably, the development of the market economy and the 
resulting pluralization of social interests have gradually undermined 
the foundation of the managerial model.  It has become increasingly 
difficult to identify “the public interest” or “the common good” in this 
more complex environment.  At the same time, the party-state’s status 
as the authoritative representative of the public interest and definer of 
the common good has become more and more contested.  With the 
development of the internet and other changes that have made it 
easier and cheaper to collect, disseminate and exchange information 
and views, members of the public have a greater opportunity to assert 
their interests and express their policy preferences. 11   As Wang 
Shaoguang points out, in recent years, ordinary citizens’ agenda-
setting capacity has increased significantly.12  The party-state and its 
think tanks can no longer dominate public discourse and monopolize 
agenda-setting. Citizens are increasingly outspoken in criticizing 
public policies and putting pressure on decision-making agencies to 
                                                                                                           
 10 See Xiaobo Zhang, Fiscal Decentralization and Political Centralization in China: 
Implications for Growth and Inequality, 34 J. COMP. ECON. 713 (2006) (explaining how the 
government policies aligned with the fiscal policies to create a potential for increasing gaps 
in equality). 
 11 According to the 22nd Statistical Report of China’s Internet Development published 
by China Internet Network Information Center, by June 2008, China’s Internet users have 
reached 253 million, rated as number one in the world.  22nd Statistical Report of China’s 
Internet Development, CHINA INTERNET NETWORK INFORMATION CENTER 8 (June 2008), 
http://www.cnnic.cn/gywm/zzkw/cnnicndbg/201206/P020120612352143162427.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/VH3T-S35J].  Moreover, the amplitude of Internet users is surprisingly 
large: in the first six months of 2008, China’s Internet users have increased by forty-three 
million. Id. 
 12 Shaoguang Wang, Changing Models of China’s Policy Agenda Setting, 34 MODERN 
CHINA 56, 59 (2008). 
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reflect their preferences and address their concerns. 13   Greater 
recognition of citizens’ rights to association has brought about a 
significant increase in the number of social organizations14 and has 
strengthened citizens’ capacity to take collective action. 
With these changes, the managerial model has become 
increasingly inadequate and unsustainable.  First, as will be shown in 
our case studies below, in a more pluralistic and complex society, 
decision-making agencies face more challenges in grasping the 
“public interest” that must inform their policymaking.  They need to 
understand the ever-changing structure of, and the relationships 
among, increasingly diverse interests and groups in society.  
Approaches under the managerial model¾such as government-
initiated unidirectional investigation—are often incapable of 
gathering and interpreting the information necessary for informed 
and effective decision-making.  Second, the increased ability of the 
general public to articulate and assert its interests, evaluate policies, 
and undertake collective action means that the policies must attain a 
higher level of public acceptance if they are to be effective.  A policy 
that contradicts the preferences of the public may well face fatal 
public resistance to its implementation.  Cooperation from the general 
public has become much more important for policy implementation 
than before.  The most effective and reliable way to secure the 
public’s cooperation is to attend to the public’s policy preferences 
throughout the process of policy-making—something the managerial 
model has difficulty in achieving.  Third, China’s transition from a 
“shortage economy” to a much more prosperous society has provided 
interest groups with greater incentives and abilities to “capture” 
policymaking bodies.  The managerial model is particularly 
vulnerable to capture, and corruption, because of its low levels of 
transparency and openness to input by a wider public.15  Such capture 
                                                                                                           
 13 Id. at 70–73. 
 14 Shaoguang Wang & Jianyu He, Associational Revolution in China: Mapping the 
Landscapes, 35 KOREA OBSERVER 1 (2004); see also Gao Bingzhong & Yuan Ruijun, 
ZHONGGUO GONGMIN SHEHUI FAZHAN LANPI SHU [THE BLUEBOOK CONCERNING CHINA’S 
NATIONAL & SOCIAL DEVELOPMENT] (2008) (discussing the social development and some of 
the social organizations).  
 15 It is widely agreed in the literature on regulatory capture that increased transparency 
can reduce the likelihood of agency capture.  See e.g. DANIEL CARPENTER & DAVID A. MOSS, 
PREVENTING REGULATORY CAPTURE: SPECIAL INTEREST INFLUENCE AND HOW TO LIMIT IT 
(2013) (explaining how to limit the likelihood of regulatory capture).  See China GDP: How 
It Has Changed Since 1980, GUARDIAN, 
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and corruption can give rise to public discontent, which undermines 
the government’s legitimacy and capacity to implement policies. 
China’s ruling party and the central government have already 
become very aware of the urgent need to carry out political and 
administrative reforms to address these problems associated with the 
managerial model.  Reforms to expand citizens’ participation in 
political and administrative processes have constituted a key part of 
the agenda.  The official Report of the 16th National Congress of the 
CCP called for the party to “improve democratic institutions, develop 
diverse forms of democracy, expand citizens’ orderly political 
participation, protect people’s right to democratic election, 
democratic decision-making, democratic management and 
democratic supervision, safeguard people’s extensive rights and 
freedom, respect and protect human rights.”16  The Report of the 17th 
Party Congress committed to “improve transparency and public 
participation in decision-making and publicly consult the people 
when making laws, regulations and public policies that are closely 
related to the interest of the people.”17  In the Report on Government 
Work at the second session of the 10th National People’s Congress 
(NPC), Premier Wen Jiabao stated that the government should: 
[I]nsist upon democratic and scientific decision-
making, develop a decision-making mechanism that 
combines public participation, expert consultation and 
government decision-making, guarantee the 
scientificness and correctness of policies, accelerate 
the construction and improvement of collective 
decision-making system for major issues, expert 
consultation system, public scrutiny and hearing 
system, and decision-making accountability system. 
All important issues must be decided through 
                                                                                                           
http://www.theguardian.com/news/datablog/2012/mar/23/china-gdp-since-1980 
[https://perma.cc/L2Z9-KCWM] (last visited May 19, 2017) (stating that China’s GDP in 
2012 is more than thirty times comparing to GDP in 1978). 
 16 Full Text of Jiang Zemin’s Report at 16th Party Congress, 16TH CONGRESS, 
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/49007.htm [https://perma.cc/TM6D-3HQ5] (last 
visited Apr. 7, 2015). 
 17 Full Text of Hu Jintao’s Report at 17th Party Congress, BEIJING REVIEW (Oct. 24 , 
2007), http://www.bjreview.com.cn/17thCPC/txt/2007-10/25/content_83051.htm 
[https://perma.cc/KE9Z-FYUE]. 
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collective discussion based upon intensive 
investigation, extensive consultation of opinions, and 
sufficient scientific evidence. This should be a basic 
working rule of the government that is to be insisted 
upon over the long term.18 
Against this background, a series of administrative reforms 
emerged in many localities, which finally ring the death knell of the 
managerial model.  Under all of these local reform experiments, 
decision-making authorities have ceded—voluntarily or 
involuntarily—part of their decision-making power to the general 
public.  In some places, this revised sharing of decision-making 
power even received institutional endorsement. 
In the next Part, we examine several concrete examples of 
how the managerial model failed and gave way to new practices of 
governance and administration.  The cases discussed here occurred 
during a relatively recent two-year period, and include: Xiamen city 
resolving the “PX crisis” (concerning the siting of a polluting plant) 
through public participation;19 the Shanghai municipal government 
listening to the opinions of residents concerning a magnetic levitation 
railway program;20 the Chongqing government resolving a strike by 
taxi drivers through constructive conversations with them; 21  and 
Hunan province adopting an administrative procedure regulation 
which prescribes public participation for major decision-making 
(zhongda xingzheng juece). 22  There are many other similar cases 
                                                                                                           
 18 Premier Wen’s Government Work Report, PEOPLE’S DAILY ONLINE (Mar. 16, 2004), 
http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/200403/16/eng20040316_137651.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/K9ZT-LMMT]. 
 19 For the report of the event, see Chinese Residents Force Relocation of Chemical 
Plants in Xiamen, 2007, GLOBAL NONVIOLENT ACTION DATABASE, 
http://nvdatabase.swarthmore.edu/content/chinese-residents-force-relocation-chemical-
plant-xiamen-2007 [https://perma.cc/9LWK-KXS5] (last visited Apr. 7, 2015) (providing 
background information regarding the relocation of chemical plants in Xiamen city in 2007). 
 20 For the report, see Royston Chan & Sophie Taylor, Hundreds Protect Shanghai 
Maglev Rail Extension, REUTERS, http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/01/12/us-china-
maglev-protest-idUSPEK32757920080112 [https://perma.cc/2SQ9-XUBH] (last visited Jan. 
12, 2008) (providing examples of how the public influenced the railway program). 
 21 For the report, see Sky Canaves, Cab Drivers Stage Strike in China City, WALL ST. 
J. (Nov. 4, 2008), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB122573906150693971 
[https://perma.cc/KJ4A-X9XV] (describing the strike). 
 22 See Jamie P. Horsley, Public Participation in the People’s Republic: Developing a 
More Participatory Governance Model in China, YALE L. REV. (2009) (explaining the 
different methods of decision-making). 
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across the China, some of which predate those analyzed in this 
article.23  We choose to analyze these four recent cases here because 
they are particularly revealing about the differences between the 
traditional “managerial” and emerging “participatory” models of 
governance, the complexity of the transition from the old model to 
the new model, and the structural components of the new model. 
II. CASE STUDIES OF THE DECLINE OF THE MANAGERIAL 
MODEL AND RISE OF THE PARTICIPATORY MODEL 
1. The PX Crisis in Xiamen 
The PX crisis in Xiamen is a landmark in the history of rising 
public participation in China’s administrative governance. Facing 
criticism and street protests against a planned chemical plant, the 
municipal government responded constructively, listening to 
resident’s opinions and eventually changing its original decision.24 
In early 2001, two Taiwan corporations applied to the Xiamen 
municipal government to construct a PX project with annual 
productive capacity of the chemical at 800,000 tons in the Haicang 
Economic Development Zone. 25   The Haicang Economic 
                                                                                                           
 23 For example, the “democratic talkfest” practice in Taizhou City, Zhejiang Province 
emerged in late 1990s.  See generally TAIZHOU DEPARTMENT OF PROPAGANDA, JICENG 
MINZHU ZHENGZHI JIANSHE: ZHEJIANG SHENG TAIZHOU SHI MINZHU KENTAN YANJIU 
[BUILDING GRASSROOT DEMOCRACY: THE RESEARCH TO THE DEMOCRATIC DELIBERATIVE 
MEETING IN TAIZHOU CITY IN ZHEJIANG PROVINCE] (2003) (discussing democratic practices 
in a particular province); see also Lang Youxing Shangyi Minzhu yu Zhongguo de Difang 
Jingyan: Zhejiang Wenling shi de ‘Minzhu Kentanhui’ [Deliberative Democracy and 
Chinese Local Experience: ‘Democratic Talkfest’ in Taizhou, Zhejiang], in XIESHANG 
MINZHU DE FAZHAN: XIESHANG MINZHU LILUN YU ZHONGGUO DIFANG MINZHU GUOJI 
XUESHU YANTAO HUI LUN WENJI [THE DEVELOPMENT OF DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY: 
ANTHOLOGY OF THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE THEORY OF DELIBERATIVE 
DEMOCRACY AND LOCAL DEMOCRACY IN CHINA] 206–16 (2006) (discussing democratic 
practices and how they have developed). 
 24 For other systematic discussions about this case, see generally WANG XIXIN, 
GONGZHONGCANYU HE ZHONGGUO XINGONGGONGYUNDONG de XINGQI [PUBLIC 
PARTICIPATION AND THE RISING OF NEW PUBLIC MOVEMENT IN CHINA] (2008) (explaining 
how change in the involvement of the public came about historically). 
 25 See also Tian feilong: Gongzhong Canyu de Shidai Biaoben—Xiamen PX Shijian de 
Guocheng Fenxi yu Moshi Guina (公众参与的时代标本——厦门 PX事件的过程分析与
模式归纳) [A SAMPLE OF PARTICIPATION ERA: THE PROCESS AND MODEL OF THE PROTEST 
FOR PX INDUSTRIAL PROJECT IN XIAMEN] in GONGZHONG CANYU YU ZHONGZHONG 
XINGONGGONG YUNDONG DE XINGQI [PUBLIC PARTICIPATION AND THE RISE OF CHINA’S NEW 
PUBLIC MOVEMENT] (2008) (examining the protest in Xiamen). 
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Development Zone was established in 1990 specifically for chemical 
industries.  The zone struggled.  Although twenty square kilometers 
in the zone were set aside to attract investment from the famous 
Taiwanese tycoon Wang Yongqing, the effort proved unsuccessful.26  
During the following decade, only a few chemical companies moved 
into the zone and carried out only small-scale production.27  Around 
2000, Haicang became a hot spot for residential real estate 
development.  In this case, with so many homes in the area, the 
establishment of a large chemical factory might well pose health risks 
to public health. 
The Xiamen government welcomed the PX project because it 
promised to provide considerable fiscal revenue.  The government 
followed proper procedures in approving the project, conducting an 
environmental impact evaluation. 28   In March 2007, when the 
Chinese central government’s annual “Two Meetings”—the plenary 
sessions of the National People’s Congress (NPC) and the Chinese 
People’s Political Consultative Conference (CPPCC), respectively—
were being held in Beijing, 105 CPPCC members, led by Professor 
Zhao Yufen, a member of the Chinese Academy of Science, 
submitted a proposal to the CPPCC annual meeting, seeking to 
relocate the PX project by arguing that the project would cause 
significant environmental pollution.29  This proposal soon became the 
most celebrated proposal of that year’s CPPCC session and also 
immediately attracted the attention of Xiamen residents, especially 
homeowners in the “Future Seashore” estate in the Haicang 
Economic Development Zone.30  Such information was disseminated 
                                                                                                           
 26 Id. 
 27 Id. 
 28 See Xiamen PX Xiangmu Huoyou Renda Paiban (厦门 PX 项目或由人大拍板) [The 
Local People Congress may decide the Xiamen PX project], 厦 门 , CAIJING.COM, 
http://www.caijing.com.cn/2007-12-15/100041974.html  [https://perma.cc/Q52R-Y7LP] 
(outlining a comprehensive environmental impact evaluation). 
 29 See Xiamen Baiyi Huagong Xiangmu Cheng Lianghui Jinji Yian Bei Zanhuan Pizhun 
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approval of proposal to relocate PX project).  
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quickly among Xiamen residents through the internet and cell phones, 
resulting in widespread public worry and even panic. 
The Xiamen municipal government responded swiftly.  On 
May 28, 2007, the director general of the Xiamen Environmental 
Protection Bureau openly addressed the rising concerns about the 
potential pollution of the PX project in an interview published in the 
official municipal party newspaper Xiamen Daily.  The next day the 
CEO of the company in charge of the PX project published a long 
article in Xiamen Evening defending the project.  On May 30, Ding 
Guoyan, Xiamen’s vice mayor, held a press conference to announce 
the postponement of the project.31 
Extraordinary though these steps were, they failed to satisfy 
the public.  On June 1, thousands of residents demonstrated at the PX 
project construction site and another road in the nearby residential 
area. Citizens called their collective action “going for a walk” rather 
than a “demonstration” or “protest,” which might receive a much less 
tolerant response from local authorities.32   The collective “walk” 
lasted until the nightfall of the next day.  No physical conflict 
occurred.  Later in June, the Xiamen government asked the Chinese 
Academy of Environmental Science (CAES) to conduct an 
environmental evaluation of Xiamen’s municipal planning.33  The 
CAES report, released for public consultation on December 5, 2007, 
posited two conflicting identities for Haicang: on the one hand, it is 
identified as a chemical industrial zone; on the other hand, it is 
recognized as an area famous for its scenery and vital tourism sector.  
The public consultation process involved a two-day public forum on 
environmental evaluation held from December 13 to 14. Two days 
before that, more than 100 representatives of the public were selected 
to participate through a voluntary sign-up and televised lottery.  The 
forum included invited government officials, twenty-one experts and 
more than 100 resident public representatives. Almost 90% of 
resident representatives opposed the PX program.  The forum was 
broadcast live on local television.  Zhu Zilu, the Xiamen city 
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government deputy secretary-general, acknowledged that this forum 
was unprecedented in terms of its transparency and procedural 
openness.  Ultimately, the Xiamenm government reconsidered its 
approval of the PX project, and later the project was relocated to 
Gulei Peninsula in Zhangzhou, about seventy kilometers from 
Xiamen.34 
The Xiamen PX case makes it clear that the legality of an 
administrative decision to approve a project is not alone sufficient for 
the decision to be accepted by the public and, in the end, implemented.  
Other conditions are necessary as well, and the managerial model of 
administrative governance employed by the Xiamen municipal 
government was ill-suited to realize those conditions.  First, whether 
a decision is reasonable in substance is significant as well, and input 
from those with expertise is important to making that determination.  
In the case of the PX project, the Xiamen PX project did go through 
all the legally required procedures.  The PX project was approved by 
the National Bureau of Environmental Protection, as required by 
relevant laws and regulations.35  The Bureau has a mandate only to 
conduct environmental evaluations of particular projects, but not to 
consider the broader contexts, including other aspects of municipal 
planning that affect the environment.  The latter falls under the 
jurisdiction of the municipal government.36  This limitation on the 
Bureau’s power leaves too much discretion to local government to 
ignore environmental issues. 37   Once members of the public 
mobilized to resist the PX project, the Xiamen government sought 
additional input from relevant experts in the relevant field.  But the 
purpose of the municipal government’s entrusting the China 
Academy of Environmental Science to conduct an environmental 
evaluation was to use third-party expertise to enhance the credibility 
of the government’s decision to approve the project.  Therefore, the 
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government was still following the managerial model, and even then 
its effort fell short because the evaluation report concluded that the 
problem was one of municipal planning which environmental experts 
could not resolve.38 
Second, the PX case shows that the acceptability to the public 
of certain policy initiatives does matter, and that the managerial 
model has difficulties in achieving just that.  As mentioned, perhaps 
to the government’s surprise, the local people rose up against the PX 
project, mobilizing themselves through cell phones and the internet. 
After becoming aware of people’s fear and discontent, the 
government tried to reshape public opinion through official media. 
This strategy failed, and the crisis deepened as it turned out 
unsuccessful in defusing public concerns.  This set of events calls into 
question the premise that decision-making agencies “naturally” 
represent the public interest. 
Moreover, it also demonstrates the shortcomings of a system 
that does not provide institutionalized channels for members of the 
public to express their views of the public interest.  Ordinary Chinese 
people have very limited channels to file complaints and express 
concerns to the government.  The main function of the “letters and 
visits” (xinfang) system is to provide information to officials.39  Yet 
this function is realized only to a limited extent because individual 
xinfang petitions rarely attract the attention of high-level decision-
makers.40  Opportunities for organized collective action are limited 
as well.  Although the PRC Constitution promises in Article 35 the 
right to demonstrate and protest, exercise of this right is constrained 
in practice.  The same is true for the constitutional right to association 
prescribed in the same article, as it is very difficult to formally 
establish non-governmental organizations to represent citizens’ 
interests.  In the PX case, the residents in Xiamen developed an 
ingenious strategy to bypass these limitations.  The residents 
established informal networks rather than formal organizations, and 
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did not “protest” but merely “walked” together.41 In this way, they 
did not directly challenge the government’s authority and they 
expressed their concerns and opposition without making government 
officials lose face.  Hence, they did not elicit the kind of pushback 
from local authorities commonly seen in cases of street protest. 
Eventually, the two-day public forum helped the government 
come to a policy decision that ultimately won public acceptance. 
Although the public forum was only an ad hoc arrangement and just 
for consultation, it enhanced procedural transparency and fairness in 
decision-making and opened up a space for each side to express its 
opinions.  At the forum, opponents of the PX project asked the 
government to consider, among other topics, the following: the 
conflict between the project and the need to preserve Xiamen’s value 
as a seashore tourism site; the failure of the project to satisfy national 
energy-saving and emissions reduction criteria; and the potential that 
the PX project could produce serious pollution and other harm.42 
Proponents of the project called for striking a balance between 
economic development and environmental protection, and asked 
whether there were special interest groups behind the protest.43  On 
both sides, citizens actively participated in administrative decision-
making. 
In summary, the Xiamen PX case involved a spontaneous 
effort by members of the public to organize themselves around 
informal networks and protest against unreasonable or undesired 
(rather than illegal) administrative decisions in an institutional 
environment that was unfriendly to public participation.  The 
government responded to this effort in a moderate way, offering 
innovative channels for public participation and dialogue between the 
government and citizens to resolve the crisis.  Although the PX crisis 
did not result in an institutionalized mechanism for participatory 
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decision-making, it does indicate a shift in Xiamen away from 
Xiamen’s managerial model of administrative decision-making, 
toward a more open and participatory process.  The result was a “win-
win” situation: the crisis of a growing confrontation between citizens 
and the government was resolved peacefully, members of the public 
saw their concerns addressed, and the government’s authority was 
preserved. 
2. Extension of the PX Crisis model: the Magnetic Levitation Crisis 
in Shanghai 
Shortly after the PX case arose in Xiamen, a similar set of 
events emerged in Shanghai, with roots that dated back to early 
2007.44   On January 18, 2007, the Shanghai Magnetic Levitation 
Company submitted an environmental evaluation report to the 
National Bureau of Environmental Protection for approval of the 
construction of a magnetic levitation railway to connect the city’s two 
airports.  The completion time was set to be for 2010, when the 
Shanghai Expo 2010 would take place.  The Report, which was made 
available online, revealed that the railway would be allowed to come 
within twenty-five meters of residential buildings.45  Worried about 
the health effects of possibly living too close to a source of magnetic 
radiation, local residents began to lodge complaints with the 
authorities through the “letters and visits” system.46  In mid-March, 
the National Bureau of Environment Protection sent a delegation to 
Shanghai’s Minhang District to evaluate the environmental report 
submitted by the magnetic levitation railway company.  More than 
5000 residents went to the district government to submit petitions 
concerning the report.  Their challenge was based on procedural 
grounds, suggesting that the report was neither published in the media 
nor posted in residential areas, and therefore, it did not meet the 
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requirement of transparency.  Also in March, officials of the Minhang 
district government, together with many experts, went to local 
communities to talk with individual residents in an effort to make up 
for the lack of public participation in the initial decision-making 
process.  Two months later, the residents were notified that the project 
was postponed.  On December 29, the Shanghai Bureau of City 
Planning published online an amended project plan open for public 
comment until January 18, 2008.  According to the amended plan, the 
railway line would be shortened from 34.8 km to 31.8 km.  One part 
of the line would be relocated closer to a river, and farther away from 
residential areas, while the other part would be built underground.  
Nonetheless, local residents opposed the revised program.  They 
contended that the revised standard of thirty meters between the train 
line and residential areas was still inadequate because it was shorter 
than the fifty meter distance which was the common practice in China, 
and far short of the German standard of 300–500 meters.47   An 
environmental evaluation of the amended program, posted on the 
official website “Shanghai Environment Hotline” for public 
consultation between January 2 and January 15 concluded that the 
magnetic radiation from the proposed railway met relevant standards 
and was safe. 48   This conclusion, too, immediately drew public 
opposition.  Some residents with expertise in relevant fields argued 
that the computational method used in the environmental evaluation 
report was inappropriate and failed to reflect the risks accurately.49 
Residents soon mobilized themselves in efforts to make their 
voices heard.50  Similar to the PX case in Xiamen, the participants 
were careful to avoid any provocative labels such as “protest” or 
“demonstration.”  Some residents gathered at Ganghui Plaza under 
the rubric of “shopping together” at Guanghui Plaza on January 6. 
Six days later, they gathered again for the purpose of “taking a walk” 
through the People’s Square, and then on busier adjacent streets, 
including the famous Nanjing Road.  The protest was largely peaceful 
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and provoked no conflict between protesters and the police.  On the 
same day as the People’s Park Square and Nanjing Road protests, the 
Shanghai Center for Radioactive Environment Monitoring Center 
responded to residents’ requests and conducted a test at the magnetic 
levitation railway’s model line, with representatives of the residents 
present.  The representatives later used the result of the test to 
challenge the accuracy of the magnetic levitation railway company’s 
original environmental evaluation report.51 
The local government responded as follows.52  On January 7, 
Chen Jun, the head of the Minhang district government, went to the 
site of the magnetic levitation railway model line with officials from 
various district departments and consulted twelve resident 
representatives.  On the evening of January 8, the Letters and Visits 
Office of the Minhang district government organized a meeting that 
included magnetic levitation experts, district officials, and resident 
representatives to address the following controversial issues: how to 
conduct public consultation on the proposed project; the time period 
for consultation; the negative impacts of the project including noise, 
vibration, and radiation pollution; and the potential infringement of 
the property rights of local residents.  The district government 
subsequently established four public consultation centers.  Many 
residents discontinued their “walking” protests and turned to these 
centers to voice their concerns.  On January 18, a public notice was 
published on both “Shanghai Environment Hotline” and the official 
portal of the Shanghai Bureau of City Planning, expressing the local 
authorities’ appreciation of the active participation of residents 
during the period of consultation and encouraging local residents to 
continue communicating with the government after the comment 
period.  Although the government rejected residents’ request to 
extend the period of public comment and hold a public hearing on 
this issue, it did demonstrate a willingness to consult with the 
public.53 
The pattern apparent in the Shanghai magnetic levitation 
railway case is similar to that of the Xiamen PX case: at the initial 
stage, decision-making bodies did not take into account the policy 
preferences of local residents, and thus missed an opportunity to build 
public acceptance of the policies.  This was particularly obvious in 
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the local government’s approach to soliciting public comment: the 
initial announcement was published online but not in other media 
such as newspapers or posted in the residential communities.  The 
local government therefore appeared to seek to keep a low profile and 
to avoid the attention of local residents.  Once local residents became 
aware of the matter, they mobilized swiftly to pursue collective action, 
including “letters and visits,” “shopping together,” “going for a walk,” 
and so on.  These protests created a public crisis which the 
government could not ignore.  Pressure from the public thus had a 
substantial impact on the government’s agenda-setting. 
Over the two-year course of the controversy, the local 
government shifted significantly from passive listening to the public 
(if at all) toward active consultation with the people.  Once members 
of the affected public started to see “letters and visits” as an 
ineffective means to express their concerns and moved to more 
protest-like tactics, the government became more willing to engage 
in “listening to opinions in an open manner.”54  Effective dialogue 
and communication ensued.55  Eventually the proposed project never 
materialized.  Apparently, after the public row, relevant authorities 
understood that they needed to consider the acceptability to the public 
of their policy decision and to take into account the preferences of the 
public in their decision-making. 
3. Taxi Drivers’ Strike in Chongqing 
On November 3, 2008, more than 8000 taxi drivers went on 
strike in the city of Chongqing to protest their exploitation by taxi 
companies. 56   The strike was a result of the power imbalances 
between employers and employees in Chongqing’s taxi industry.  In 
many Chinese cities, including Chongqing, the taxi industry is 
regulated by a licensing system: the government sells licenses to taxi 
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companies, which then assign the licenses to individual taxis and 
lease the licensed taxis to drivers, charging high fees.57  As a result, 
the bulk of the income from taxi fares goes to the taxi companies, 
resulting in a distribution that many drivers regard as unfair.58 
The second day into the strike, the Chongqing government 
held the first of five press conferences in a four-day period.59  It 
publicly apologized for the inconvenience caused by the strike and 
promised to lower the excessive management fees charged by the taxi 
companies, to increase the number of gas stations across the city, and 
to crack down on the illegal operation of unregistered taxis.60  On 
November 4, many of the striking taxi drivers went back to work.  On 
November 5, the management fee charged to drivers was reduced by 
50 RMB per day.  On the same day, all taxis resumed operation and 
the strike came to an end.61 
On November 6, Bo Xilai, the party secretary of Chongqing 
at the time, promised to take steps to address the problems facing the 
taxi industry and presided over a consultation meeting that included 
forty taxi driver representatives, twenty residents’ representatives, 
five representatives from the taxi companies, and two representatives 
from gas stations.62  The three-hour consultation meeting, at which 
most of the speakers were taxi drivers, was broadcast live by the 
official Xinhua news agency and on Chongqing’s main websites, 
radio and television stations.63 
The Chongqing taxi strike case differs from the Xiamen PX 
and Shanghai magnetic levitation railway case in a few interesting 
respects.  First, although each of the three cases involved the local 
government, a group of affected citizens, and an interested third party 
(e.g., the taxi companies), the “third party” was much more actively 
engaged in the consultative phase of the Chongqing case.  In this 
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sense, participation in administrative decision-making from outside 
the government was more complex and arguably broader. 
Second, unlike the residents in Xiamen and Shanghai, the taxi 
drivers in Chongqing undertook a full-fledged protest in the form of 
a strike.  The right to strike is not recognized in China’s constitution 
and has no basis in Chinese law. 64   Nonetheless, the Chongqing 
government did not clamp down on the strike.  Instead, and even 
absent the more widespread public dissatisfaction in the other two 
cases, the Chongqing government was in some respects more 
accommodating than its counterparts in the other two cities.  It 
communicated swiftly with the stakeholders and the broader public, 
adopted a form of public participation in order to re-examine the 
regulatory framework of the taxi industry, and ultimately adjusted the 
rules in accordance with the opinions expressed during the public 
consultation process.65 
Third, Bo Xilai and the Chongqing Municipal Commission of 
Transport Management considered a proposal which, if adopted, 
could have created a new channel for effective public participation in 
decision-making: namely, to establish a new association to represent 
taxi drivers in Chongqing.  Such an association could have reduced 
the imbalance of power between employers and employees in terms 
of their potential influence on government policy-making.  
Chongqing’s Taxi Industrial Association is an organization of 
employers, which does not represent the interests of employees.66  
Taxi drivers have no similar organization to press for their interests 
when the government solicits outside input with regards to decision-
making.  This pattern holds true across sectors throughout China.  
Employers in specific industrial sectors have well established 
associations, and they also have the comprehensive Association of 
Industry and Commerce.  For sure, employees are technically 
represented by the All-China Federation of Trade Unions (ACFTU), 
but it does not provide an effective corporatist arrangement—much 
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less an independent trade union structure—to represent workers’ 
interests.  The ACFTU system lacks the clear demarcation that is 
necessary between the rights and interests of workers versus those of 
their employers.67  China’s intra-company labor unions are largely 
controlled by employers. 
However, the ACFTU rejected Chongqing’s proposal 
above.68  This prevented a novel approach that could have resulted in 
a “win-win” for the local government and affected citizens (in this 
case, taxi drivers) in Chongqing.  Such an arrangement could have 
reduced the transaction costs for the government in obtaining (and 
responding to) meaningful input from the taxi drivers.  If the taxi 
drivers were allowed to have their own representative organization, 
communications between them and the government could be made 
much more effective and efficient—in both directions.  It would also 
make it easier for the local government to manage issues in this sector.  
Moreover, such an organization would make it easier for government 
decision-makers to avoid the dominance of the more powerful and 
organized group (employers); to offer adequate representation for the 
relatively weaker group (employees); and thereby to support more 
participatory decision-making and achieve more widely acceptable 
policy outcomes. 
4. Hunan Administrative Procedure Rules 
All of the above three case studies illustrate increased public 
participation¾but in each case, that was the result of a discrete crisis, 
and it depended to a large extent upon the personal qualities of 
individual local officials.  Undoubtedly, these factors constitute a 
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DAILY] (Nov. 15, 2008), http://acftu.people.com.cn/GB/8345487.html 
[https://perma.cc/DV89-8SN4] (stating that the Federation’s rejection is based upon the 
Constitution of Chinese Trade Union, which stipulates that members within the same 
enterprise, public service institution, government departments and other social organizations 
should be included in a single grass roots level trade union organization). 
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fragile foundation for public participation to be institutionalized in 
administrative decision making.  But in some localities, there have 
been promising efforts to accomplish just that.69  A notable step in 
this regard was taken by Hunan Province with the Administrative 
Procedure Rules (“Hunan APR”) it enacted in October 2008.70 
Chapter 3 of the Hunan APR provides that every “major 
administrative decision” (zhongda xingzheng juece) 71  must be 
formulated through a multi-step process that includes preliminary 
investigation, expert review, “notice and comment,” lawfulness 
review, and consensus decision-making. 72   Popular input is 
anticipated at two of these stages, preliminary investigation before a 
plan for decision-making is formulated, and then again after a draft 
plan is ready and made public.  At the preliminary investigation stage, 
the undertaking agency is directed to carry out in-depth research on 
the subject matter of the contemplated decision, to collect all 
necessary information, and to consult relevant parties for negotiation 
and coordination.73 
Once the draft plan for a “major administrative decision” is 
published, the Hunan APR directs the undertaking agency to “seek 
the opinions of the general public,” 74  choosing among several 
potential methods that include “convening discussion forums, 
holding consultations, [and] listening to opinions in an open 
manner.”75  In certain circumstances, e.g., “when the general public 
has major differences on the decision-making plan,” a public hearing 
                                                                                                           
 69 Among laws, regulations enacted by the State Council, and rules, the Price Law and 
the Temporary Method for Public Participation in Environmental Protection stipulates some 
procedures for public participation. 
 70 Hunansheng Xingzheng Chengxu Guiding [Hunan Province Administrative 
Procedure Rules] [hereinafter Hunan APR] (promulgated by No. 222 Order of Hunan 
Provincial Government, Apr. 17, 2008), available at 
https://law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/Intellectual_Life/CL-PP-
Hunan_APA_Bilingual.pdf [https://perma.cc/Z5EA-4ZAV].  
 71 According to Article 31 of the Hunan APR, major administrative decisions are those 
made by people’s governments at the county level and above concerning matters that involve 
the overall economic and social development situation of the region, have extensive social 
ramifications, involve a high degree of specialization and are closely linked with the people’s 
interests.  Specifically, such decisions include major policy measures for economic and 
social development, master spatial plans, budgeting, major government investment projects, 
major matters about the disposal of state-owned assets, etc.  
 72 Hunan APR, supra note 70, art. 34–43. 
 73 Hunan APR, supra note 70, art. 34. 
 74 Hunan APR, supra note 70, art. 35. 
 75 Hunan APR, supra note 70, art. 37. 
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should be held.76  As to the scope of public participation, generally, 
and the selection of participating representatives, the Hunan APR 
indicates that these “should be determined to ensure fair expression 
of opinions by those in the general public who would be affected by 
the decision-making.” 77   Somewhat analogous to the practice of 
“notice and comment” under Section 553 of the U.S. Administrative 
Procedure Act,78 the Hunan APR also provides that “the opinions of 
the general public and the situation regarding their adoption should 
be made public to society.”79 
Because meaningful and effective public participation often 
depends upon access to information, the Hunan APR emphasizes 
open government principles throughout its provisions¾requiring 
greater disclosure than even the national Regulations on Open 
Government Information.80  Specifically, the Hunan APR requires 
not only disclosure of substantive government information, but also 
procedural openness, for example the openness of administrative 
meetings convened by local governments to address policy issues.81  
It was reported that during the first year since the enactment of the 
Hunan APR that 125 administrative meetings had been made 
public.82 Worth noting is that this is actually broader than the national 
government transparency regime first established in 2008 under the 
Open Government Information Regulations, which only requires 
publication of  completed administrative decisions.83  Information 
concerning unfinished administrative procedures has been 
                                                                                                           
 76 Hunan APR, supra note 70, art. 38. 
 77 Hunan APR, supra note 70, art. 37. 
 78  5 U.S.C. § 553 (1966). 
 79 See supra note 103. 
 80 See generally Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on the Disclosure of 
Government Information (promulgated by Decree No. 492 of the State Council, Apr. 5, 2007) 
(discussing the government information disclosure regulations). 
 81 See, e.g., Hunan APR, supra note 70, art. 130 (“Administrative hearings should be 
held in an open manner except when state secrets, commercial secrets that are protected in 
accordance with the law, or the privacy of individuals are involved.”). 
 82 HUNANSHENG XINGZHENG CHENGXU GUIDING YIZHOUNIAN JUECE TINGZHENGHUI 
227 CI 湖南省行政程序规定一周年 决策听证会 227 次 [One Year Anniversary of Hunan 
APR Public Hearings on Decision-making for 227 Times], REDNET.CN (Sept. 18, 2009, 
11:42:25 PM), http://hn.rednet.cn/c/2009/09/18/1827549.htm [https://perma.cc/LMC8-
B92V]. 
 83 Regulations of the People’s Republic of China on Open Government Information 
(promulgated by the State Council, Jan. 17, 2007, effective May 1, 2009), available at 
https://law.yale.edu/system/files/documents/pdf/Intellectual_Life/CL-OGI-Regs-
English.pdf [https://perma.cc/3ACL-3JFY]. 
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categorized as undisclosable processual information by the General 
Office of State Council since 2010.84  
Altogether, the Hunan APR can be regarded as a prototype 
administrative procedure law for China, which despite decades of 
scholarly efforts remains wanting of its own comprehensive 
legislation on administrative procedure. 85   It is the sort of local 
government rule that, by accumulating experience, can help to propel 
forward future legislation at the national level.  Already, it has 
influenced other local jurisdictions to adopt similar rules.  For 
instance, since 2008, 12 localities across China have followed the 
footsteps of Hunan to promulgate their own comprehensive rules on  
administrative procedures. 86   The impact of Hunan APR upon 
subsequent local rules of administrative procedures is notable on a 
variety of fronts from basic structure to substantive prescription such 
as explicit mentioning of the proportionality principle, which is 
originally a German import.87  Additionally, in April 2017, the Office 
of Legal Affairs of State Council published a draft version of the 
revised Regulations on Procedures of Formulating Administrative 
Rules for public comments, which contains very similar provisions 
concerning basic requirements of rule-making procedures as the 
Hunan APR does.  All of this can be seen as the positive repercussion 
from the Hunan APR.  
                                                                                                           
 84 Available at http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2013-09/13/content_1472.htm 
[https://perma.cc/X37H-XPUJ]. 
 85 Xingzheng Chengxufa Nanchan 25 Nian Beihou: Quanli Buyuan Zifu Shoujiao 
行政程序法难产 25 年背后：权力不愿自缚手脚 [Behind the Stillbirth of Administrative 
Procedure Act: Power does not want Self-restraints], CHINANEWS.COM (May 14, 2010, 1:56 
PM), http://www.chinanews.com/gn/news/2010/05-14/2283088.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/UDL4-XJMP] 
 86 Shengshixian Sanji Yichutai 12 Bu Difang Xingzheng Chengxu Guiding 
省市县三级已出台 12 部地方行政程序规定 [Twelve Administrative Procedures Rules 
have been Promulgated by Governments at Provincial, Prefectural and County Levels], 
XINHUANET.COM (Nov. 26, 2015, 1:31:01 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/politics/2015-
11/26/c_128471785.htm [https://perma.cc/8GQ4-ALU3]. 
 87 Zhang Jiansheng, Cong Difang dao Zhongyang: Wo Guo Xingzheng Chengxu Lifa 
de Xianshi yu Weilai (从地方到中央: 我国行政程序立法的现实与未来) [From Local to 
Central: Realities and Prospects of Administrative Procedures Legislation in China], 
STUDY OF ADMIN. L. 54 (2017).  
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5. The Participatory Model’s Features and Prospects 
In addition to the developments described above in Xiamen, 
Shanghai, Chongqing, and Hunan, similar efforts to reform decision-
making processes have been taking place in many other localities 
across China over the last decade or so, including (but not limited to) 
“democratic consultation meetings” in Taizhou city of Zhejiang 
Province,88 public participation in rule-making in Guangzhou,89 and 
the reform of administrative decision-making in Shenzhen.90  These 
examples suggest a transition from the traditional, closed “managerial” 
decision-making model to a new, more open “participatory” model, 
as local government leaders increasingly see the need for such change. 
How have local governments been able to promote 
participatory governance while the basic structure of the party-state 
bureaucracy has not substantially changed?  Part of the answer lies in 
the growing recognition by central authorities that the style and 
method of administrative governance affects whether policies will 
succeed. 91   This central-level realization gave local officials 
latitude—and incentive—to undertake experiments in administrative 
reform.  Part of the answer also lies in changes in the policy aims 
dictated by the top national leadership.  Once the CCP and central 
government started promoting the “outlook of scientific development” 
                                                                                                           
 88 Chen Tiexiong (陈铁雄), Jiceng Xieshang Minzhu zai Taizhou de Xianxing Tansuo 
yu Shijian (基层协商民主在台州的先行探索与实践) [The Pilot Exploration and 
Practice of Grass-root Democracy in Taizhou], DANGJIAN.CN, (Apr. 1, 2014), 
http://www.dangjian.cn/djgz/jc/201301/t20130104_1011744.shtml [https://perma.cc/S7S4-
GL8R].  
 89 Lian Hongyang (练洪洋), Guangzhou rang Gongzhong Canyu Zhengfu Guizhang 
Zhiding Gonggong Juece Minyi Shuo le Suan (广州让公众参与政府规章制定 
公共决策民意说了算) [Guangzhou lets the Public to Participate in Government Rule 
Formulation—Public Opinions Count in Public Decision-making], PEOPLE.COM (July 20, 
2006, 07:44 AM), http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/30178/4609116.html 
[https://perma.cc/H2AW-6VS5]. 
 90 Zhang Xiaolin (张小玲), Shenzhen Shi Zhongda Xingzheng Juece yao xian Cha 
Hefaxing (深圳市重大行政决策要先查合法性) [Major Administrative Decision-making 
Must First Check Legality], NANFANG METROPOLIS DAILY (Nov. 10, 2016), 
http://epaper.oeeee.com/epaper/A/html/2016-11/10/content_92457.htm#article 
[https://perma.cc/YD2A-TAKU]. 
 91 Evidence for this point can be found not only in CCP and central government work 
reports, but also in the enactment of the Regulations on Open Government Information, 
supra note 80.  
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around 2003, 92  the criteria for evaluating cadres’ performance 
changed from a one-sided emphasis on  economic performance to a 
more balanced and diverse set of considerations that include 
provision of public services, environment protection, and social 
stability.93  Likewise, the process of evaluation came to include wider 
use of democratic assessment and opinion polls.94  These changes 
mean that local leaders have more reasons to focus on—and compete 
in—pursuing participation-enhancing administrative reforms that are 
helpful in satisfying the new (not purely economic-growth focused) 
criteria. 
The cases analyze above reveal the main features of the 
emerging, more participatory administrative decision-making model:  
1. The public interest is recognized as the product of 
plural and diversified interests that can be expressed by the public 
themselves.  From Xiamen to Shanghai, for decision-making on 
major construction projects, identifying the public interest is now 
seen as requiring government bodies to recognize and synthesize 
particular citizen interests.  Administrative decision-making bodies 
shoulder the responsibility of identifying the public interest and 
making decisions according to the public interest.  Because they are 
not able to define the public interest entirely on their own, decision-
making bodies need to rely on the cooperation and input of the public. 
2. Although the organizational basis of decision-making 
is still hierarchical and bureaucratic, reforms over the last decade 
                                                                                                           
 92 Scientific Concept of Development and a Harmonious Society, CHINA.ORG (Oct. 8, 
2007), http://www.china.org.cn/english/congress/227029.htm [https://perma.cc/6C7L-
PBZ4]. 
 93 Mao Xiaolin (毛小林), Kexue Fazhanguan yu Guanyuan Nengli Pingjia Tixi 
Goujian (科学发展观与官员能力评价体系构建) [Scientific Development and 
Constructing the Evaluation System of the Capacity of the Officials], PEOPLE’S TRIB. (Nov. 
2009), http://paper.people.com.cn/rmlt/html/2009-11/11/content_389191.htm 
[https://perma.cc/2W2Y-LPY2] (last visited Sep.16, 2017). 
 94 In July 2006, the Organizational Department of the CCP Central Committee 
announced the “Experimental Method to Assess Local Party and Government Leaders 
according to the Concept of Scientific Development.”  In 2013, the finalized ordinance 
about reforming cadre evaluation system was promulgated.  See Jiang Tao (蒋涛), 
Zhongzubu Chu Kaohe Xingui; Zhongquan Pochu GDP Chongbai (中组部出考核新规 重
拳破除 GDP 崇拜) [COD Initiated New Rules Aiming to Exclude GDP Worship], 
CHINANEWS.COM (Dec. 12, 2013 07:45 PM), http://www.chinanews.com/gn/2013/12-
12/5613882.shtml [https://perma.cc/CZH9-HU6D] (making major adjustments to cadre 
assessment indicators and procedures, which directly impact officials’ conceptions of 
political achievement and focus attention on the party and government’s responsiveness to 
local citizens).  
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have made this structure more open to public input and participation.  
Aforementioned reforms that added public service, environmental 
protection and social stability to the list of policy targets and cadre 
evaluation criteria, and introduced procedural techniques such as 
democratic assessment and opinion polls in cadre evaluation have 
given local administrative decision-making bodies more incentives to 
respond actively to the demands and opinions of the public.  
Additional reforms—such as the extension to higher levels of the 
competitive electoral system that already applies to village self-
governance¾would provide even greater impetus for local officials 
to be responsive to the public. 
3. In terms of agenda-setting in daily governance, party 
and government agencies share power, to some degree, with the 
public.  Both the Shanghai and Xiamen cases documented above 
demonstrate that the public now enjoys increased opportunities to 
influence government agenda-setting through procedures adopted by 
the government or through expressing public opinion in the media 
and on the internet. 
4. Since the 2008 OGI Regulations, administrative 
transparency has become more institutionalized, giving the public 
more reliable access to the information needed in order to formulate 
opinions and participate in shaping administrative decisions.  
Administrative agencies are required to respect and uphold the 
public’s right to know.  Many members of the public now actively 
provide decision-making bodies with information about their 
interests, and decision-makers pay more attention to information 
provided by the public when making decisions, as evidenced by the 
participation of large number of citizens in both the Xiamen and 
Shanghai protests. 
5. Decision-making bodies have come to adopt multiple 
channels for the representation and expression of public interest 
beyond the few, highly constrained ones that characterized the 
managerial model of decision-making.  These new channels include 
consultation meetings, deliberation meetings and public hearings, all 
of which were present in the cases discussed above. 
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III. PARTICIPATORY GOVERNANCE: THEORETICAL 
FRAMEWORK 
We have set forth the key features of China’s emerging 
participatory mode of governance.  In this section, we offer 
arguments about why the participatory governance model is more 
normatively attractive than the managerial governance model, and 
why it is appropriate for contemporary Chinese society.   
1. Participatory Governance: A Normative Assessment 
The participatory model can surpass the managerial model in 
enhancing government legitimacy.  It can do so because the 
participatory model regards citizens as stake-holders (or cooperative 
partners) who influence the process of governance, not as mere 
subjects of governance who occasionally provide information to 
bureaucrats (who set targets, make policy choices, and implement 
policy). 
This emerging model, in China, is broadly consistent with the 
PRC Constitution’s principle of popular sovereignty, which is 
reflected in the constitutional provision that the National People’s 
Congress¾the organ of popular sovereignty¾is the supreme organ 
of state power.95  The legislature expresses the will of the people, 
while the authority of the executive derives from that of the 
legislature.96  When the government faithfully obeys the will of the 
legislature, the democratic legitimacy of the legislature can be 
                                                                                                           
 95 XIANFA art. 2 (1982) (China).  Article 2 of the 1982 Constitution declares that “All 
power in the People’s Republic of China belongs to the people. The National People’s 
Congress and the local people’s congresses at various levels are the organs through which 
the people exercise state power.”  This provision is generally held as defining the “popular 
sovereignty” principle of the Chinese Constitution, i.e., all state power ultimately derives 
from “the people,” who exercise such power through the national and local people’s 
congresses.  See Zhang Qianfan, From Popular Sovereignty to Human Rights: On the 
Paradigm Transformation of Chinese Constitutional Jurisprudence, 1 ASIA L.Q. 1, 1–20 
(2009), http://www.klri.re.kr/uploadfile/AK21/ALQ_200901_01.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/3KKV-WY4S] (showing the power dynamic set forth in the Constitution 
of the People’s Republic of China).  Thus, the legislature holds primary authority.  
Administrative and judicial powers derive from the legislative power and are under 
legislative supervision.  See XIANFA art. 57 (1982) (stating “[t]he National People’s Congress 
of the People’s Republic of China is the highest organ of state power.”). 
 96 Id. 
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transmitted to the executive’s policy decisions.97   Judicial review 
plays an auxiliary role, ensuring that when the government’s 
sanctions affect citizens, those actions remain within the bounds set 
by the legislature.  The prominent American administrative law 
professor Richard Stewart once called this the “transmission belt” 
model of legitimate administrative action.98  In this model, the state’s 
executive organs play the role that Weber conceived for bureaucrats: 
a relatively mechanical function that takes orders from the legislature 
and executes those orders.99 
The “transmission belt” model has certain shortcomings, 
however, from the perspective of a participatory model of governance.  
Under the “transmission belt” model, public participation in 
administrative decision-making is only indirect¾limited to the 
selection of legislative representatives, and to whatever forms of 
public participation are available in the legislative process.  Moreover, 
with the legislature constrained in its capacity to regulate an 
increasingly complex society, more and more power is delegated to 
the executive, expanding bureaucratic jurisdiction and discretion.  
Since bureaucrats inevitably have their own interests and preferences, 
and do not necessarily follow the will of the legislature,100 constraint 
over the executive thus become less stringent than the “transmission 
belt” idea might suggest.  Given the ease with which government can 
satisfy the requirements of formal legality without taking public 
interests and preferences into account, formal legality therefore looks 
increasingly ineffective in securing substantive legitimacy for 
administrative decisions.101 
Expertise might offer a separate basis for legitimating 
administrative decision-making that is “participatory” in the limited 
                                                                                                           
 97 Wang Xixin (王锡锌) & Zhang Yongle, (章永乐), Zhuanjia, Dazhong yu Zhishi de 
Yunyong (专家、大众与知识的运用) [The Public, Experts and the Use of Knowledge] 24 
SOC. SCI. IN CHINA 113 (2003). 
 98 Richard B. Stewart, The Reformation of American Administrative Law, 88 HARV. L. 
REV. 1667, 1675 (1975). 
 99 Max Weber, Bureaucracy, in FROM MAX WEBER: ESSAYS IN SOCIOLOGY 232-35 (H.H. 
Gerth & C. Wright Mills eds. & trans., 1958). 
 100 See generally ANTHONY DOWNS, INSIDE BUREAUCRACY 4–5, 79 (1967) (describing 
the internal and external motivations for bureaucrats). 
 101 See Stewart, supra note 98, at 1684 (discussing the failure of both “transmission belt” 
theory and traditional “expertise” model to legitimate agency action when the agencies are 
only considered to “adjust competing private interests” without taking the public into 
account). 
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sense that it requires input from actors outside of party-state organs.  
Expertise is legitimating because experts are professionally trained, 
with rigorous disciplinary qualifications, and thus can be assumed to 
make decisions that are substantively rational and politically 
neutral.102  During the New Deal period in the United States, the 
Roosevelt administration used this justification to expand 
administrative power.103 
Rooting government legitimacy in professional expertise is 
inferior, however, in several respects, to a more fully participatory 
approach.  Experts can be very good at finding the best means to 
achieve pre-determined ends¾but they are not especially capable of 
choosing among different or even conflicting ends.  Choices among 
ends often entail choices among values, which are political choices.  
Secondly, experts are inevitably subject to the limitations of their 
disciplines.  Their views of complex problems can be partial and 
parochial.  When experts from different fields are brought together to 
address a policy problem, the process does not necessarily lead to an 
optimal policy outcome.  There may well be irreconcilable conflict 
between their perspectives.  Finally, the professionalism of the 
experts does not guarantee rational application of their expertise to 
promote general welfare.  When there is room for substantial 
discretion (as there often is in policy making), “governance by 
experts” may satisfy the requirements of formal legality while 
favoring special interest groups.104 
Moreover, the advent of the information age has undermined 
the advantages and legitimacy of relying on experts in policy-making.  
Experts’ monopoly on knowledge and information has been 
broken.105  Equipped with new technology, many more people can 
collect information—and even develop their own skills and 
expertise¾to make independent judgments on policy matters, with 
less deference to the authority of experts.  This pattern is quite evident 
in China.  For example, in the Xiamen and Shanghai cases discussed 
above, the public challenged environmental experts’ supposedly 
“scientific conclusions.”106  Even though environmental protection 
standards and impact assessments involve highly technical matters, 
                                                                                                           
 102 Wang & Zhang, supra note 3. 
 103 Stewart, supra note 98, at 1684. 
 104 See Wang & Zhang, supra note 3 (analyzing from an epistemological perspective). 
 105 Id.  
 106 Id. 
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which may not be fully understood by ordinary citizens, the residents 
in Xiamen and Shanghai had information that empowered them to be 
more critical.  They were able to compare China’s national standards 
with those used in developed countries and see the notable gap 
between them.  This became the basis on which the citizens 
challenged the experts’ conclusions and authority.  This phenomenon 
was unimaginable before the advent of the information age. 
The more direct public participation in governance that is 
emerging in China can address the deficiencies of both the 
“transmission belt” and “expertise” paradigms canvassed above, and 
better enhance the legitimacy of administrative governance.  Such 
public participation can make up for the weakness of legislative 
control over the executive, and hence make the practice of the 
government more truly representative of the public interest.  (At the 
same time, by giving the public a more direct role to play in decision-
making, it can enhance public acceptance of government policies as 
well.)  Greater public participation can also introduce additional 
information and analysis into decision-making to complement—and 
constrain—experts’ input, enhancing policy rationality.  In official 
Chinese terminology, these legitimacy and rationality-enhancing 
functions of public participation represent “the democratization and 
scientification” of government decision-making.107 
Actually, greater public participation in the processes of 
administrative governance has been a global trend since the 1980s.108  
Throughout the world, there has been ever more emphasis on the 
recognition and protection of the people’s “right to know” and their 
right to participate in administrative decision-making. 109   Global 
trends, however, cannot simply be assumed to offer models that are 
well suited for contemporary China.  Different countries at different 
stages of development pose very different conditions, and attempts at 
                                                                                                           
 107 Wang & Zhang, supra note 97. 
 108 See, e.g., 7th Global Forum on Reinventing Government Building Trust in 
Government (June 26–9, 2007), Vienna, Austria, Public Administration and Democratic 
Governance: Governments Serving Citizens (Jan. 2007) (highlighting the role of the public 
in governance).  
 109 For a historical account of this phenomenon, see Michael Schudson, THE RISE OF THE 
RIGHT TO KNOW: POLITICS AND THE CULTURE OF TRANSPARENCY, 1945-1975 (Harvard Univ. 
Press, 2015) (providing a historical outlook of how the “right to know” rose in popular 
political culture).  For an evaluation of the global growth of government transparency 
legislation, see John M. Ackerman and Irma E. Sandoval-Ballesteros, The Global Explosion 
of Freedom of Information Laws, 58 ADMIN. LAW REVIEW, 85–130 (2006) (analyzing the 
political culture that favors transparency). 
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“legal transplant” can fail for many reasons.  The key question, then, 
is whether participatory governance may be appropriate for China 
and its society today? 
2. Does Participatory Governance Suit China? 
The case studies presented in Part II of this article illustrate 
an almost simultaneous emergence of participatory governance in 
many places across China that was not the direct result of intentional 
design or political campaigns initiated from the central government.  
Rather, participatory governance has emerged both from local 
governments responding to local crises and from local leaders’ 
ambition to be at the forefront of political and administrative reform 
in China.  These dynamics provide evidence that participatory 
governance is rooted in China’s current social context, can work in 
China, and ought not be dismissed as a passing fad.  This assessment 
has far-reaching implications for China’s future governance. 
Why is this emerging model suitable to contemporary 
Chinese society?  First, participatory governance has clear 
instrumental utility.  As discussed earlier, broader public 
participation can make policy decisions easier to implement because 
they are more likely to be acceptable to the public.  Opportunities for 
the public to participate in decision-making also can serve as a safety 
valve to relieve mounting social tension and dissatisfaction in China 
today. 
Since the beginning of the twenty-first century, China has 
entered a period of increased social unrest.  The number of “mass 
incidents” has increased significantly, from 8700 in 1993, to more 
than 90,000 in 2006.110  The increase in mass incidents is not the 
result of economic stagnation or recession, but rather the consequence 
of the imbalances that have accompanied the rapid economic growth 
that China has achieved so far.111  For a variety of reasons, many 
ordinary people’s grievances often have not been addressed properly 
by local governments, giving rise to increased social tension and 
instability. 
                                                                                                           
 110 See “Liao Wang” Wenzhang: Qunti Xingshi Jiantui Dong Fansi (“瞭望” 文章: 群
体性事件推动反思) [Collective Turbulences Push Forward Reflection], LIAOWANG (Dec. 
22, 2008), http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2008-12/22/content_10541258.htm (describing 
the social unrest in the twenty-first century). 
 111 Murray Scot Tanner, China Rethinks Unrest, 27 WASH. Q. 137 (2004). 
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In recent years, central authorities have taken new steps to 
address mass incidents, including the development of a public 
emergency management system in the form of the 2007 Law on 
Emergency Response and a program at the central Party School to 
train county party secretaries on how to respond to public 
emergencies.112  While all of this focuses on ex post facto diffusion 
of the conflict, participatory governance offers a more fundamental 
and proactive approach to the problem.  In principle, it provides 
marginalized social groups with channels to participate in and 
influence government decisions and policies, which will then help 
lessen the prospects for social unrest.  
Second, participatory governance is suited to increasing 
urbanization in China.  According to official statistics, urban areas 
are now home to more than half of China’s people, and China’s 
urbanization rate may reach 65% by 2030.113  Urban areas feature 
higher levels of social diversification and pluralization, higher levels 
of education, greater access to information technology, and, in turn, 
greater capacity among citizens to take action to influence 
government decision-making.  In addition, the population density of 
urban areas means that citizens’ collective action usually can have a 
more significant and widespread impact on society.  Local 
governments in such areas consequently face more severe challenges 
if they adopt poorly designed policies that have not benefited from 
public input or secured public acceptance.  Ongoing rapid 
urbanization therefore is likely to accelerate the expansion of 
participatory governance in China, including as a means to relieve 
social grievances resulting from rapid urbanization itself. 
                                                                                                           
 112 See JACQUES DELISLE, EMERGENCY POWERS LAW IN ASIA 342 (Victor V. Ramraj & 
Arun K. Thiruvengadam eds., 2010) (describing the emergency response law); Zhongyang 
Dangxiao dui Xianwei Shuji Lunxun Guanzhu Tufaxing Shijian Chuli Deng (中央党校对县
委书记轮训关注突发性事件处理等) [Party School of the CCP Central Committee Trains 
County Party Secretaries in Rotation with a Focus on How to Deal with Emergencies], 
CHINANEWS.COM (Nov. 15, 2008), http://www.chinanews.com.cn/gn/news/2008/11-
15/1450314.shtml [https://perma.cc/AN6Z-5ENQ] (explaining the government-
implemented emergency response protocols). 
 113 See CHINA ACADEMY OF SOCIAL SCIENCES, 2008 Nian Zhongguo Chengshi 
Jingzhengli Lanpishu: Zhongguo Chengshi Jingzhengli Baogao (2008 年中国城市竞争力
蓝皮书: 中国城市竞争力报告) [A Blue Book on the Competitiveness of Chinese Cities in 
2008: China Cities Competitiveness Report] (2008). 
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At the same time, conditions favoring participatory 
governance are emerging even in China’s rural areas. 114   Many 
villages are no longer purely agricultural societies, but instead are 
under the ubiquitous economic and cultural influence of urban areas.  
As China’s rural economy and society change accordingly, the 
information needed for policy-making becomes more complicated 
and the managerial mode of governance less adequate.  Furthermore, 
some changes in rural China are reducing the previously high cost of 
citizens’ collective action.  For example, the penetration rate of 
computers and internet in the countryside grew at more than a 60% 
annual rate¾albeit from a low baseline of a mere 52.7 million—from 
2007 to 2008.115  As the difference in life circumstances between 
people living in urban and rural China shrinks, their previously 
different modes of governance are likely to converge toward the 
participatory governance model. 
Third, participatory governance offers important 
psychological and cultural benefits to Chinese citizens.  The practice 
of self-governance, especially the experiences of collective 
communication and deliberation, can reduce the psychological 
alienation felt by many citizens under the managerial model and can 
enhance social trust and social solidarity. 
The problem and danger of alienation in Chinese society is 
reflected in the worrying phenomenon described by the Chinese 
sociologist Yu Jianrong as “mass incidents without actual interests 
                                                                                                           
 114 It should be noted that competitive elections were introduced in China’s rural areas 
earlier than in urban areas.  See Kevin J. O’Brien, Understanding China’s Grassroots 
Elections (Aug. 22, 2009), 
http://polisci.berkeley.edu/sites/default/files/people/u3854/OBrien-Introduction.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/EA7V-6YZ3] (noting that rural areas in China had competitive elections 
before urban areas had competitive elections).  However, the existence of village elections 
does not mean that the governing mechanism in rural areas changed substantially.  In most 
places, villagers have nothing to do with public affairs after casting their votes.  Villages 
with successful participatory governance are hard to find.  See Tong Zhihui, Cunmin Zizhi 
Sanshinian (村民自治三十年) [Three Decades of Village Self-Governance], STUDY TIMES 
(April 7, 2008), 
http://www.sociologyol.org/yanjiubankuai/fenleisuoyin/fenzhishehuixue/nongcunshehuixu
e/2008-04-16/5158.html [https://perma.cc/ME3M-XEC6] (highlighting lack of participation 
from villagers in rural areas). 
 115 The 23rd Statistical Report of Internet Development in China, CHINA INTERNET 
NETWORK INFORMATION CENTER (Jan. 22, 2009), 
http://www.cnnic.net.cn/research/bgxz/tjbg/200906/t20090615_18388.html 
[https://perma.cc/KF26-6VAC]. 
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involved.”116  Those who participate in this kind of incident often do 
not have a particularized interest at stake.  They merely express 
general discontent.  If such discontent cannot be handled effectively 
by established social channels and political institutions, it can lead to 
ever greater social antagonism and, ultimately, explosions of unrest. 
Xiamen’s PX case provides a good example of how the 
participatory model of governance can help to address such problems 
of alienation.  Xiamen residents banded together to pursue a specific 
goal in which they had a direct stake: protecting the environment of 
their city.  During this process, many residents felt that they united 
into a community that shared the same destiny.  The process produced 
a sense of self-fulfillment and solidarity.  Participation was a form of 
social therapy.  To be sure, the Xiamen PX case and other incidents 
that have spurred the development of participatory governance at 
local levels also involve tension and even confrontation among 
participants.  Social groups with different interests may well hold 
conflicting opinions.  But orderly public participation offer a 
preferable means for addressing such conflicts—one that is much 
better than trying to cover up differences and letting them fester. 
Finally, China’s emerging model of participatory governance 
offers a promising and reliable pathway to carrying out China’s 
broader agenda of political and administrative reform in an orderly 
way.  The goal of broadening citizens’ participation in politics was 
officially endorsed at the Seventeenth Party Congress.  Left open was 
the question of the means to achieve that goal.  The participatory 
model of governance that is emerging in China is, in its nature, a 
project of “orderly participation” that promises to avoid the social 
turbulence that has often accompanied democratization in developing 
countries.  China’s model of participatory governance adopts a path 
of incremental reform, using existing political and administrative 
organizations as the basic platform on which to widen citizens’ 
participation.  In this process, pragmatic considerations often drive 
adjustments of the basic political structure.  In its operation, 
participatory governance is highly flexible, and can reflect the 
                                                                                                           
 116 Yu Jianrong, Shehuixiefengshijian Zhong Quntixinliyanjiu: Dui “Wen’anshijian” 
Fashengjizhi De Yizhongjieshi (社会泄愤事件中群体心理研究—对 “瓮安事件” 发生
机制的一种解释) [Study on the Collective Psyche in Social Anger-Venting Incidents: An 
Explanation of the Originating Mechanism of Wen’an Incident] SOCIOLOGY PERSPECTIVE, 
Feb. 28, 2009, http://www.sociologyol.org/yanjiubankuai/xuejierenwu/yujian/2009-02-
28/7376.html [https://perma.cc/5BWV-LMVQ]. 
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demands of different situations in different localities.  Moreover, 
participation can be promoted alongside the rationalization of 
administrative organization.  In principle, this process of reform can 
utilize as fully as possible the knowledge and expertise of 
administrative officials, while at the same time opening decision-
making processes to the wisdom of the people. 
In sum, the most compelling argument for participatory 
governance in China is not just that it follows some global trend or 
standard, but rather that it well suits China’s particular conditions and 
can help resolve China-specific problems.   
IV. INSTITUTIONAL COMPONENTS OF PARTICIPATORY 
GOVERNANCE 
We now turn to the basic institutional framework for a 
participatory model of governance to be more fully realized in China.  
These components include core institutional infrastructure, 
supporting institutions and procedural techniques. 
In terms of the core institutional infrastructure, two elements 
are particularly crucial: (i) a system of open government information 
and (ii) collective representation of interests.  The first, open 
government information, is based upon the simple idea that 
information is the basis for decision-making.  So, if members of the 
public know little or nothing about the operation of the government, 
they cannot adequately supervise the government or make any 
meaningful criticisms or suggestions concerning government 
policy.117  Sharing of information is the first step toward sharing of 
decision-making power.  Because bureaucracies’ default position is 
often to withhold information, many countries have enacted 
legislation to impose duties to disclose information on the 
government.  In China, national OGI Regulations enacted in 2008 
impose such duties and specify the categories of information that the 
government must make public.118  While the OGI Regulations does 
not establish explicitly the principle that 
                                                                                                           
 117 See generally THE RIGHT TO KNOW: TRANSPARENCY FOR AN OPEN WORLD (Ann 
Florini ed., 2007) (addressing what information governments and other powerful 
organizations should disclose); JAMIE P. HORSLEY, TOWARD A MORE OPEN CHINA (2005), 
http://policydialogue.org/files/publications/Toward_an_Open_China_Horsley.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/4GW2-UNN3] (discussing the development of government transparency 
in China, “as well as the prospects for China’s further opening”). 
 118 See [Author name], supra note 111, art. 19. 
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“disclosure is the rule and non-disclosure is the exception,” nor does 
it prohibit local governments from promulgating open government 
rules that require disclosure of an even wider range of information 
than mandated at the national level (unless other laws require that the 
information be kept secret). 
Second, collective representation of interests is crucial to 
participatory governance because the transaction costs of negotiating 
with unorganized individuals in an area with a large population 
(which is often the case even at very local levels in China) are 
impossibly high.  Efficient decision-making requires that individuals 
with common interests band together so that their interests can be 
expressed and represented collectively by associations.  With these 
channels of representation and expression, administrative agencies 
are more likely to be assured that the information they receive is 
reliable and the policies they make are accordingly more likely to be 
accepted by the members of the affected public, including those who 
do not directly participate in the decision-making process. 
Of course, for collective representation to work most 
effectively, China will need to gradually relax the limitations that 
have previously been placed on people’s right to associate, so that 
interest groups can establish organizations capable of expressing their 
views and interests.119  To ensure robust collective representation, 
attention must be paid to mechanisms for empowering weaker and 
more diffuse groups of interested parties.  This is necessary to avoid 
disproportionate influence by stronger social groups with higher 
levels of organization and, in extreme cases “regulatory capture.”120  
Decision-making bodies therefore should take measures to empower 
disadvantaged social groups by reducing the costs of organizing 
collective action and to assure their ability to express their interests 
and make their voices heard in policy-making processes. 
Beyond these two core institutions, effective participatory 
governance in China also depends on several additional supporting 
institutions, which still need further reforms to be truly 
complementary. 
                                                                                                           
 119 See generally QIANFAN ZHANG, THE CONSTITUTION OF CHINA: A CONTEXTUAL 
ANALYSIS (2012) (addressing the still dormant political and religious rights in China). 
 120 On regulatory capture, see generally Jean-Jacques Laffont & Jean Tirole, The 
Politics of Government Decision-Making: A Theory of Regulatory Capture, 106 Q.J. ECON. 
1089 (1991) (discussing an agency-theoretic approach to interest-group politics).  
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1. Legislative supervision of administration 
In China, it is both necessary and possible to promote 
participatory governance and legislative empowerment 
simultaneously.  The latter can support the former.  At the same time, 
embrace of participatory governance could strengthen legislative 
capacity to control and supervise government administration, as well.  
In performing oversight functions, for example, over government 
budgets that are technically mandated under Chinese law but not fully 
realized as of yet, legislative supervision would serve as a (less direct) 
form of public participation, by raising opinions that the public shares 
or protecting interests that the public would assert.121  
2. Courts and judicial review 
Administrative litigation is another important support 
institution for meaningful public participation in governance.  
Lawsuits to challenge administrative actions are especially 
significant for members of the public who are under-represented in 
administrative decision-making processes.  The effectiveness of 
administrative litigation is limited in China, however, because until 
2015, courts were authorized to review only “specific” administrative 
acts, not the underlying rules that might be the basis for such acts. 
Since the 2015 revision to the Administrative Litigation Law, 
Chinese courts are now allowed to review the underlying rules.  Yet 
it remains to be seen whether the updated judicial review system can 
help the public to challenge effectively government decisions of a 
more generalized nature.  
3. The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference 
(“CPPCC”) 
Designed to represent diverse social groups, the CPPCC—
and lower-level political consultative conferences—can also play, at 
least in theory, a significant supportive role in the process of 
participatory governance.  Through their proposals at conference 
                                                                                                           
 121 For a critical assessment of the lack of representation in China’s local congresses, 
see MELANIE MANION, INFORMATION FOR AUTOCRATS: REPRESENTATION IN CHINESE LOCAL 
CONGRESSES (2015) (forming an opinion on the lack of public representation in local 
government). 
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sessions, conference members can set agendas for administrative 
decision-making through their rights to “participate in and deliberate 
on public affairs.”122   Then, during the process of administrative 
decision-making, political consultative conference members can also 
represent the policy preferences of members of the public to 
government decision-makers.  
4. Think tanks and expert consultation 
In the process of participatory governance, decision-making 
bodies and the public need input from experts on many technical 
matters that arise in the context of administrative decision-making.  
The development of think tanks and expert consultation systems 
therefore can contribute to the improvement of participatory 
governance.   
5. Mass media and the dissemination of views and information 
Mass media can perform several vital roles in supporting 
participatory governance.  The media can publish government 
information and report public opinion.  Both the public and 
administrative bodies may engage in agenda-setting, discussion of 
issues, or even policy debates through the media.  Media coverage 
also provides an important platform for policy feedback and 
supervision after decisions are made.  
V. TECHNIQUES FOR ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION-MAKING 
Furthermore, a participatory model of governance entails 
several procedural techniques for administrative decision-making.  
From our perspective, the following are the most fundamental: 
1. Specifying the Scope of Public Participation 
Although a significant role for public participation in 
government decision-making is central to the participatory model of 
governance, it would be impossible to have public participation in 
                                                                                                           
 122 THE NATIONAL COMMITTEE OF THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE 
CONFERENCE, THE CHINESE PEOPLE’S POLITICAL CONSULTATIVE CONFERENCE CHARTER 
(1982), http://www.cppcc.gov.cn/2011/09/14/ARTI1315980170869872.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/Q8PW-S7TB]. 
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every instance.  Decision-making inevitably operates within limits 
imposed by technology, fiscal pressure, available time, and other 
constraints on resources.  As John Clayton Thomas argues, 
sometimes the substantive policy choice is clear, the government 
already has adequate information without public participation, and 
public acceptance is not crucial for policy implementation.123   In 
these cases, administrative agencies can make decision without 
public input.124  But such situations are rare.  On most issues, public 
participation is vital or at least helpful. 
In the absence of national administrative procedure legislation 
in China, provisions governing the scope of public participation are 
scattered across many statutes, regulations, and local rules.125  Some 
of these provisions notably support widened public participation.  For 
example, Article 35 of the Hunan APR stipulates that, except for 
matters that other laws provide shall not be made public, decision-
making bodies must publish a draft of “major administrative 
decision-making” plans and solicit opinions from the general public 
for a period of not less than twenty days.126  Furthermore, Article 38 
                                                                                                           
 123 See John Clayton Thomas, PUBLIC PARTICIPATION IN PUBLIC DECISIONS: NEW SKILLS 
AND STRATEGIES FOR PUBLIC MANAGERS 8 (1995) (opining that the public is not always 
needed to make decisions in the government, particularly when all the relevant information 
is available to the government but may not be available to the public). 
 124 Id. 
 125 See, e.g., Huanjing Yingxiang Pingjia Gong Zhong Canyu Zanxing Banfa (环境影
响评价公众参与暂行办法) [Provisional Ordinance Concerning Public Participation in the 
Evaluation of Environmental Influence] (promulgated by National Environmental Protection 
Bureau, February 14, 2006, effective March 18, 2006) (providing the example of the use of 
the public in decisions regarding environmental issues); Guizhang Zhiding Chengxu Tiaoli 
(规章制定程序条例 ) [Ordinance Concerning the Procedures for the Formulation of 
Administrative Rules] (promulgated by the St. Council, November 16, 2001, effective 
January 1, 2002), art. 15 (providing the example of the use of the public in decisions 
regarding administrative rules); Xing Zheng Fa Gui Zhi Ding Chengxu Tiaoli (行政法规制
定程序条例) [Ordinance Concerning the Procedures for the Formulation of Administrative 
Regulations] (promulgated by the St. Council, November 16, 2001, effective January 1, 
2002), art. 12, 19, 22 (providing the example of the use of the public in decisions regarding 
administrative regulation issues); Lifa Fa (立法法) [Law on Legislation] (promulgated by 
the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Mar. 15, 2000, effective July 1, 2000), art. 58, 
2000 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ., 112 (providing the example of the use 
of the public in decisions regarding legislative issues); Jiage Fa (价格法) [Price Law] 
(promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., December 29, 1997, effective 
May 1, 1998), art. 23, 1998 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. (providing the 
example of the use of the public in decisions regarding pricing issues). 
 126 See Hunansheng Xingzheng Chengxu Guiding (湖南省行政程序规定) [Hunan 
Province Administrative Procedure Rules (promulgated by No. 222 Order of Hunan 
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requires a hearing before major administrative decision-making 
under any of the following circumstances: (i) a decision involves an 
important interest of the general public; (ii) there are notably 
differences in views among the general public toward the policy 
proposed; (iii) the policy decision might affect social stability; or (iv) 
laws, regulations or rules stipulate that a hearing be held. 
2. Sharing Agenda-Setting Power 
The power to set agendas is often more important than the 
right to participate in discussions.  Framing the agenda determines to 
a large extent the scope and depth of deliberation.  Influence at this 
stage enables citizens to play an initiating role in administrative 
decision-making, and not simply serve as the passive objects of 
governance.  Therefore, when outlining procedures for public 
participation, it is necessary to prescribe that the public has the right 
to propose issues to be decided.  Article 2 of Hangzhou’s Provisions 
on Open Decision-Making Procedures provides a good example of 
just such a rule.  It states that “citizens, legal persons and other 
organizations can submit their proposals to be deliberated and 
decided on to the Office of People’s Opinions, and these proposals 
should be forwarded to the General Office of the municipal 
government.”127 
Public participation in the agenda-setting phase can, and 
should, extend to proposing draft plans, especially in contexts where 
the decision-making process includes public hearings.  The Price Law 
provides good examples of this necessity.  Article 23 of the law 
requires that hearings be held for decisions that involve major price 
adjustments.128  And many hearings have been held in many places, 
generating some enthusiasm among the public.  Nonetheless, many 
people have found such hearings to be disappointing, in that they are 
                                                                                                           
Provincial Government, Apr. 17, 2008), art. 31 (defining “major administrative decision-
making” as involving issues that are closely related to the overall economic and social 
development at the local level, have significant social implications, require professional 
expertise, are closely related to the people’s welfare, or need high acceptance from the 
public). 
 127 Available at http://www.hangzhoufz.gov.cn/details/gfwjdetail.aspx?id=1440. 
 128 Jiage Fa (价格法) [Price Law] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s 
Cong., December 29, 1997, effective May 1, 1998), art. 23, 1998 STANDING COMM. NAT’L 
PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 
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employed to justify raising prices.  Despite many objections voiced 
by participants, it seems that almost every hearing held under the 
Price Law has led to an approval of price increases.129  This outcome 
partly reflects the weakness of public participation in agenda-setting: 
administrative bodies usually have a well-structured proposal in place 
well before they disclose any draft plan.  The agenda is already fixed 
before any public hearing is held.  Administrative bodies often use 
hearings to improve the acceptability of price increases that the body 
already plans to approve.  Accordingly, criticism about “show 
hearings” have frequently captured media headlines.130  To make the 
hearing process more meaningful as a process for public participation, 
a crucial step is to recognize a place for the public in agenda-setting 
and to allow members of the public to raise their own policy plans. 
Of course, recognition of rights is not the same thing as 
generating capacity to utilize those rights.  Even the best formal 
procedures cannot guarantee that public participation will be 
effective.  How much agenda-setting power the public can exercise 
meaningfully upon the people’s capacity to make systematic, feasible, 
and convincing proposals.  This in turn depends upon development 
of institutions such as the media, associations, and other mechanisms 
for collective representation of interests, as well as a pool of experts 
outside the party-state and its think tanks who are willing and able to 
address policy issues. 
3. Channels for Public Participation 
Several procedural techniques can provide channels for fair 
and effective public participation in administrative decision-making, 
including: notice and comment, discussion meetings, consultation 
meetings, public hearings, and “listening to opinions in an open 
manner.”  For important policy issues involving the public interest, 
notice and comment should be the required procedure.  Other 
procedural techniques can be added where they are appropriate and 
helpful in fostering public participation, and their requirements 
                                                                                                           
 129 Jiage Tingzhenghui Jue Da Duoshu Shi Zhangjia: Tingzhenghui Zhishi Zuoxiu 
(价格听证会绝大多数是涨价: 听证会只是作秀?) [Most Price Hearings for Increasing 
the Price: Are Those Hearings Just for Show?], TENCENT FINANCE (Jan. 8, 2010), 
http://finance.qq.com/a/20100108/001844.htm [https://perma.cc/43F4-HWM3]. 
 130 Id. 
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should be clearly defined.  The choice among procedures can be 
guided by the principle of equal and fair expression of interests， 
which means that both individualized and organized interests should 
be allowed to voice.131  Administrative bodies should make sure that 
interest representation is balanced and no interested party is excluded 
from the procedure.  What this requires will differ, depending on 
whether there is strong collective representation, partially collective 
representation, or non-collective representation.  Important interested 
parties should have their own representatives in the decision-making 
process.  And this may require special efforts to ensure that an 
interested party with a low level of organization is not excluded from 
the procedure.  Other procedures may be necessary when there are 
major disagreements among the public.  In this situation, fair 
representation of parties with different opinions is especially 
important.  When policy implementation demands high acceptance 
from the public, administrative agencies should adopt procedures to 
facilitate compromises among stakeholders and affected parties with 
conflicting views. 
Although particular procedures may be better-suited to 
various circumstances, every procedural technique has its own 
weaknesses.  Notice and comment procedures, for example, may fail 
to reach sufficiently wide public audiences due to time limitations 
and thereby unduly constrain the public’s access to information and 
opportunity for participation.  As noted above, in the Shanghai 
magnetic levitation railway case, notices were posted on two 
government websites but not in the residential communities along the 
proposed railway line.  This made it difficult for busy residents or 
residents without internet access to learn about the proposed decision 
                                                                                                           
 131 See Hunan Xingzheng Chengxu Guiding (湖南行政程序规定) [Hunan Province 
Administrative Procedure Provisions], art. 37 (promulgated by Hunan Province People’s 
Government, April 17, 2008, effective October 1, 2008) (providing that “the scope of 
participation by the general public and the selection of participating representatives should 
be determined to ensure fair expression of opinions by those in the general public who would 
be affected by the decision-making”); Hangzhou Shi Renmin Zhengfu Zhongda Xingzheng 
Shixiang Shishi Kaifangshi Juece Chengxu Guiding (杭州市人民政府重大行政事项实施
开放式决策程序规定) [The Provisions of Hangzhou Municipal People’s Government 
Concerning Open Decision-Making Procedures], art. 7 (promulgated by Hangzhou 
Municipal People’s Government, Jan. 13, 2009, effective Jan. 13, 2009) (stating that the 
procedure is more elaborate and that “when consulting the opinions of trade associations, 
intermediaries, interested parties, mass organizations and the public by discussion forums, 
hearings, negotiation forums, interested parties, especially the defected, unemployed, and 
new immigrants should receive fair expression of opinions.”).  
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and to get access to necessary information.  For those who have no 
access to internet, alternative channels for information and 
participation must be made available if they are to have fair and equal 
opportunities in express their views and have their interests 
represented in administrative decision-making. 
In government decision-making processes in China today, 
consultation meetings and negotiation meetings are more and more 
widely used.  In the Xiamen, Shanghai and Chongqing cases analyzed 
above, consultation meetings rather than public hearings were used. 
Compared with public hearings, consultation meetings and 
negotiation meetings are more flexible.  Although this flexibility has 
advantages in terms of cost and adaptability to the circumstances of 
a particular policy decision, it can also hinder public participation.  
Compared to public hearings and other more formal techniques, 
consultation and negotiation meetings impose fewer procedural 
constraints on the decision-making bodies.  They can communicate 
with interested parties separately, rather than all of them collectively.  
They do not need to include all interested parties, announce meetings 
publicly beforehand, or provide written records afterwards.  More 
flexible, less formal approaches can make resulting decision less 
credible or less acceptable to the public, especially groups that have 
not been fully and equally included in the process.  Where important 
decisions concerning the public interest are being made, formal 
public hearings are necessary to provide for adequate public 
participation. 
5. Legal Consequences of Public Participation 
If public participation is to have meaningful impact on 
administrative decision-making, decision-making bodies must bear a 
legal duty to respond to public input.  The most fundamental 
safeguard here is a legal duty to give reasons: decision-making 
authorities must be required to provide an account of the basis on 
which the policy is made, including especially the reasons some 
public opinions were accepted and others were not.  Article 37 of the 
Hunan APR offers a notable version of the type of requirement that 
should apply where the procedural technique is consultation meetings 
where the “responsible department should classify the opinions and 
suggestions submitted by the general public on the major 
administrative decision-making and adopt those reasonable 
Published by Penn Law: Legal Scholarship Repository, 2018
[2018] U. PA. ASIAN L. REV. 69 
suggestions.  For those opinions that are not adopted, reasons should 
be provided.”132 
Where more formal procedural techniques such as public 
hearings are employed, administrative authorities should be under 
more stringent legal obligations.  Article 139 of the Hunan APR 
offers an example of the requirements that should apply in these 
contexts.  Written records of a hearing shall be made to faithfully 
record the views and reasons presented by the speakers.  Audio and 
video recordings may also be made.  The written records of a hearing 
should be signed or stamped by the participants after being checked 
and confirmed.  Administrative authorities should take 
comprehensive consideration of all opinions presented by the 
participants and adopt those that are reasonable.  Adoption or 
rejection of suggestions made by the participants should be made 
public.  Reasons for not adopting suggestions made at a hearing 
should be provided.133   Although the Hunan Rules commendably 
impose on decision-making authorities a duty to give reasons for 
accepting or rejecting public input in its Article 37, additional 
procedural safeguards should be required in cases where public 
hearings are the technique adopted for public input.  We suggest that 
the sole permissible basis for making decisions after a public hearing 
should be what is recorded in the minutes of the hearing. 
6. Policy Feedback and Error-Correction Mechanism 
Finally, a public participation model of governance requires 
effective mechanisms for policy feedback and error-correction.  
Decision-making is not a one-off event and it does not end with the 
announcement of a decision.  Many decisions need modification after 
their adoption or initial implementation.  Policy feedback is a 
significant stage in the decision-making process, and in some cases 
can trigger a new round of decision-making processes.  After the 
announcement of a decision, policy-makers should continue to take 
into account opinions from the public.  This requires decision-making 
authorities in China to revise the mentality of the old, managerial 
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model.  It is well known that China has taken an innovative 
experimental approach to reform and development for decades, 
which has to date been met with considerable success.134  Yet ex post 
facto evaluation and modification of government decisions is as 
important as ex ante experimentation leading up to decisions.  They 
should not regard administrative litigation, administrative review or 
critical reporting in the media as burdensome or as something to be 
resisted.  Rather, they should regard administrative litigation and 
review and media coverage as mechanisms for useful policy feedback.  
Accordingly, government should avoid interfering with the freedom 
of the press to criticize public policies, specifically during the phase 
of policy implementation.  
VI. CONCLUSION 
In this Article, we have argued that a new model of 
participatory governance is emerging as a trend of administrative 
reform in China.  The decision-making process of government organs, 
particularly at the local level, is increasingly open and public 
participation in administrative process is widening and deepening.  
Through case studies of recent developments in several localities, we 
have shown how administrative innovation toward a more 
participatory model has been taking place.  On that basis, we have 
identified and discussed the essential components and main features 
of the emerging model of participatory governance. 
China’s move to a participatory model follows a global trend 
towards more public participation in governance.  However, we argue 
that the emergence of the participatory model in China is attributed 
more to its indigenous roots and the fact that it offers a better solution 
to many of China’s problems.  Greater public participation can help 
avoid imbalances in policy-making, resolve social tensions, and 
improve the quality of administrative decisions.  Through regular 
participation in policy decision-making, the public’s capacity to take 
political action can improve.  In this way, the participatory model also 
serves as a form of civic education.  The participatory model can help 
relieve the sense of alienation that has become a problem in the 
Chinese society, and enhance social trust and solidarity.  As a 
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mechanism of “orderly participation,” the participatory model also 
can serve as a guide for China’s ongoing political and administrative 
reform.  We believe that with further economic and social 
development, especially increasing urbanization, the applicability of 
participatory governance will continue to expand. 
Underlying the development of participatory governance is 
the reframing of the state-society relationship.  Effective participatory 
governance needs a strong society as well as a strong state; it requires 
an open government and mature institutions for public participation, 
as well as a society with well-developed mechanisms for interest 
representation and expression.  With the development of the public’s 
ability to define, express and argue for its diverse and sometimes 
conflicting interests in the processes of policy decision-making, 
society can increasingly share the responsibility of public governance 
and China can move toward a “participatory society.” 
We believe that the development of participatory governance 
can improve fairness in the Chinese society.  Over more than three 
decades of reform, competition among local governments for higher 
growth has given rise to China’s miraculous economic development.  
But this competition has also led to serious and consistent imbalances 
in public policy and to the slighting of many aspects of the public 
interest and public opinion.  In the decision-making process, many 
local officials act in favor of the interests of the party-state 
bureaucracy and powerful economic actors while overlooking the 
interests and preferences of other less privileged social groups.  
Participatory governance promotes more inclusive and equal 
representation and the expression of plural interests in the 
administrative decision-making process, as well as the realization of 
the public interest in specific cases.  In the relatively near term, we 
expect to see a new wave of competition among local governments 
for the advancement of “scientific and democratic decision-making,” 
which includes the key aspects of a participatory model of 
governance.  If this happens, China will witness huge progress in the 
development of political civilization after three decades of success in 
economic development. 
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